At the Borderline of Armageddon
By James E. Goodby
The sixth anniversary of 9/11 coincides with a renewed debate about Iraq. The coincidence should remind us that diplomacy has proved more effective than the use of force in containing the nuclear threat.
In my book, At the Borderline of Armageddon (Rowman and Littlefield, 2006) I described how the current administration campaigned for war against Iraq. It claimed that Saddam Hussein was reconstituting a nuclear weapons program which could only be stopped by force. Even when Secretary of State Colin Powell’s own intelligence analysts expressed skepticism, no real effort was made to get to the bottom of the matter. The war decision had been made.
My book also shows how determined the administration was to dismantle the legal structure for U.S.-Russian cooperation in controlling nuclear weapons. Fundamental changes in the U.S.-Russian relationship justified a different approach to controlling nuclear weapons, but rejecting the whole idea of joint controls was not called for.
The Bush administration came into office saying that arms control agreements were outmoded. But it has become evident in recent years that a U.S.-Russian effort to reduce their own holdings of nuclear weapons to as close to zero as is possible is necessary to block the spread of nuclear weapons to many other nations. That can only be done through verified treaties, which the Bush administration has rejected.
This administration seems unable either to anticipate events or to recall the past. It is oblivious to history. Anyone listing the most bitterly contested issues in today’s public policy debates would certainly include these: Should the United States have invaded Iraq to block its non-existent nuclear weapons program? Should the United States launch a preventive war against Iran to destroy that nation’s nuclear programs? Should U.S. diplomats negotiate with an authoritarian North Korean leader whose people are suffering under his rule? These questions rank among the handful of life-or-death decisions the Bush administration has faced, but U.S. presidents have faced very similar questions before. Their answers were very different from the ones given us by President Bush.
Eisenhower was asked to consider preventive war to block the Soviet Union’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. He refused. Kennedy and Johnson were asked to consider the same action against China’s nascent nuclear weapons program. They understood the folly of that. Reagan said and he believed that the Soviet government was an “Evil Empire,” yet he negotiated with that government because he saw that the nuclear weapon was humanity’s common enemy. Ultimately, Reagan succeeded in eliminating a whole class of nuclear-armed missiles. We are even beginning to see some progress with North Korea, now that diplomacy has been unleashed. The lessons of history are clear. The judgments of these American presidents saved the world from what surely would have been devastation on a grand scale. More diplomacy and less war will improve the world’s chances of escaping nuclear catastrophe.
James E. Goodby is a research affiliate with MIT's Program on Science, Technology, and Society, where he dedicates his research to issues involving nuclear weapons. Goodby has served in a variety of diplomatic and policy positions in both Europe and Washington, placing strong emphasis on international security affairs. He is the recipient of the Presidential Distinguished Service Award, the State Department's Superior and Distinguished Honor Award, and the Commander's Cross of the Order of Merit from the German government. In 1995, Goodby received the inaugural Heinz Award in Public Policy.
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