Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group

What Went Wrong in Afghanistan?

By Elan Journo

Two hundred twenty-two Americans died in Afghanistan in the first nine months of this year--more than in all of last year, the bloodiest year of the war, up till now. After eight years of U.S. military intervention, the fighters of the Islamist movement are not only unbowed, but on the march. The Islamists (often misidentified by one of their favored tactics: terrorism) seek to impose the totalitarian rule of Allah's law worldwide--an ideal that entails smiting down infidels and subjugating others under sharia. And they're making headway. The borderlands between Afghanistan and Pakistan are the global nerve-center of jihadist operations, where mass-casualty attacks on Western targets are hatched.

From both liberals and conservatives we hear calls for an immediate withdrawal. President Obama, for his part, has dispelled hopes of achieving victory. A common view now holds that we must resign ourselves to a world in which the Islamist menace remains a fixture of our lives--a threat we might mitigate, but never eliminate. Some now tell us we should negotiate a settlement with the Taliban, bribing them to put down their arms, at least for as long as we keep doling out cash. Witness the emerging consensus that there's no military solution--not in Afghanistan, not in the wider conflict with Islamists.

How did America, the world's most powerful nation, find itself in this morass? A shortage of troops and resources? Reliance on a corrupt Afghan regime (a fact highlighted by the charges of massive election fraud, to name a comparatively tame example)? Some combination of these themes? No, the problem goes far deeper. Our post-9/11 policy--in Afghanistan and across the board--was subverted by a factor that few have thought to examine: the basic moral ideas that animate our foreign policy.

My colleagues and I reached this conclusion by looking at how Washington has directed the military and diplomatic response. The evidence (set out in our book) shows that our culture's mainstream ideas about right and wrong are what shaped our leaders' response to 9/11--from their failure properly to identify the enemy and its chief state-sponsors, to their goals for the Iraq and Afghan wars, and on down to the rules of engagement on the battlefield. These ideas have warped the prevailing conception of the "military option." In essence, the kind of war that our leaders believed was morally proper to wage entailed placing "compassion" ahead of the proper task of self-defense.

Take one example. To avoid affronting or injuring Afghans, Washington drew up lengthy "no-strike" lists including cultural sites, electrical plants--a host of legitimate strategic targets ruled untouchable. This handed the enemy a clear advantage--all the more so as the "no-strike" lists have grown longer. The Islamists exploit this policy (e.g., hiding in mosques and situating themselves in known no-strike zones). In response, Washington has misdiagnosed the problem (its own self-effacing rules of engagement) and further hamstrung our soldiers with ever more absurd restrictions. General McChrystal, who oversees Afghanistan operations, recently lambasted U.S. policy for being "preoccupied with protection of our own forces." (!) Instead he urges that they must minimize their time in armored vehicles and walled bases and "share risk, at least equally, with the people."

That's just a sketch of a tragic larger pattern underlying not just the efforts in Afghanistan, but our broader response to 9/11. A point we make in Winning the Unwinnable War is that the way out of the Afghanistan morass requires Americans to recognize how certain (allegedly) moral ideas have informed, and crippled, our policy--and to challenge those ideas.

Elan Journo is a fellow with the Ayn Rand Institute focusing on foreign policy. He is the editor of and chief contributor to Winning the Unwinnable War: America's Self-Crippled Response to Islamic Totalitarianism.

Turkey’s New Kurdish Opening?

By Nader Entessar

On September 10, 2009, Yusuf Ziya Ozcan, the President of Turkey’s Higher Education Board, announced that the government has approved the establishment of the “Living Languages in Turkey” institute at the southeastern province of Mardin’s Artuklu University. In line with this initiative, Artuklu University, which is located in the part of the country with a heavy Kurdish population, is establishing a Kurdish language and literature department. Presently, some fifteen members of the University’s academic staff are taking Kurdish language classes. In May 2009, a delegation from Artuklu University visited the University of Dohok in Iraqi Kursdistan as part of an effort to create organic links with that and other Kurdish universities in Iraq. In addition to the Kurdish language department, the University is also in the process of establishing a department of Syriac languages and literature with the aim of making Artuklu University into a major center of academic scholarship and learning of major Middle Eastern languages, including Arabic and Persian.

The Turkish government, which is headed by the Islamic-oriented Justice and Development Party (AKP), has undertaken a number of potentially significant measures in a search for a solution to the country’s long-standing “Kurdish problem.” As I have discussed in my new book, Kurdish Politics in the Middle East, Revised Edition, the Kurdish language had long been banned in Turkey, and in 1967 the government officially outlawed publishing books and other types of printed material in Kurdish. It also made it illegal to record, sing or otherwise disseminate Kurdish songs and music. It was only during the presidency of Turgut Ozal in the early 1990s that the Turkish government acknowledged the Kurdish language as an important component of the country’s Kurdish identity. In 2008, the AKP government allowed the establishment of a state television channel to air programs in Kurdish, a measure that the country’s Kurdish population had demanded for decades. However, Kurdish critics have argued that the government’s restrictions on the Kurdish channel have hampered the free operation of this station. Likewise, many Kurds have taken a wait-and-see attitude towards the recent announcement of the establishment of a Kurdish studies program at Artuklu University.

For decades, Kurdish nationalists have demanded that Turkey recognize their legitimate cultural rights by creating a dual educational system where classes are held in both Turkish and Kurdish. The new Kurdish language department at Artuklu University may be a small step in recognition of Kurdish cultural demands as well as a calculated political move to cement Turkey’s expanding ties with the Kurdish administration in northern Iraq.

Nader Entessar is professor and chair of the department of political science and criminal justiceat the University of South Alabama. He is the author of Kurdish Politics in the Middle East, Revised Edition.

The Author of Digging Through the Bible Tentatively Scheduled to Appear on ABC Nightline

The ABC Nightline program tentatively scheduled for August 31, 11:30 EST will feature an interview with Dr Richard Freund, the author of Digging Through the Bible: Understanding Biblical People, Places, and Controversies through Archeology, on the topic of Mount Sinai and the Ten Commandments. John Donvan, the Nightline host, read Dr Freund's book and visited the site where Freund worked in 2007 and identified as the true Mount Sinai.

The Rebirth of the Middle East

By Jerry M. Rosenberg

Increasingly, there is evidence that raising living standards, creating employment opportunities, opening borders to global trade, all in differing ways become the glue for enhancing stability and prosperity throughout the Middle East.

The Rebirth of the Middle East, is based on more than 15 years of research and interviews on this proposition. To assist in evolving a regional economic community over time, for 28 nations of the Middle East, with a population nearing ½ billion people, will require trust and financial and moral assistance from other countries.

Models and flowcharts are presented to develop these concepts. A reinvented Marshall Plan for the entire area is urged, along with the historical elements of the 1948 program that gave hope to a devastated war-torn Europe. This approach encouraged the evolution of what today is the European Union, with 480 million citizens consuming 25 percent of all worldly goods.

Following two invited briefings at the US Department of State, at the World Bank, at universities and conferences throughout the world, and over the years of writing five books on the Middle East, I restructured my theories in a pre-then post-9/11 era, expanding the models and flowcharts initially limited to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to the newly defined Middle East, from Morocco in the West, to Afghanistan and Pakistan in the East.

Israel, with its 7 million citizens will play a significant role in moving the rebirth forward. Israel’s Prime Minister seeks economic cooperation with the Palestinians, even before a two-state solution. The Arab world in general seeks peace with Israel, based on meeting a series of conditions. Israel could be part of the core stimuli that drives the cross-border trade forward. And together with funding from prosperous nations of the world, a more stable and secure region can evolve.

Economic development can only be assured if there is a desire to shift from generations of antagonism to a perception that the future can bring prosperity to a frustrated population. The Arab world is rapidly changing, with 60 percent of its people under the age of 25 years. These young and aspiring people want opportunity, are swept by the powers of technology and the internet, and appear determined to rapidly move into the 21st century. Their past hopelessness can once again turn to hope; the greatness of the region more than 1,000 years ago can now be released.

Jerry M. Rosenberg is director of the Center for Middle East Business Studies, and professor of management and global business at Rutgers University Business School and the recipient of Fulbright Specialist Award in 2008. He is the author of The Rebirth of the Middle East, Reawakening: The New, Broader Middle East, and Nation-Building: A Middle East Recovery Program.

Could Mousavi’s Martyrdom Spark Revolution In Iran?

By Adam Lankford

How rarely the fate of a nation rests in the hands of just one man.

And yet, in the aftermath of the election crisis in Iran, reform candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi may be facing a momentous decision.

It’s possible that he could be in the unique position to spark revolution in Iran. But to do so would cost him his life.

In order to understand the potential significance of Mousavi’s death, it is important to understand the powerful history of martyrdom in Iran. Every year, millions of Iranians gather to commemorate the holiday of Ashura, which marks the honored death of Mohammed’s grandson, Imam Husayn ibn Ali. Legend has it that Husayn was killed in battle in 680, after he defiantly refused to swear allegiance to the corrupt dictator Yazid, despite the certainty of his death.

For many Iranians, Husayn’s death is much more than just a story or historical event. It’s the foundation of a divine moral code that insists that standing up to oppressive rulers, no matter what the sacrifice, is not just the right thing to do—it’s God’s sacred command.

Over time, the lessons of Ashura have become a fixture in Iranian politics. In the lead up to the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini accused the U.S.-backed Shah of being a modern day Yazid: a corrupt and illegitimate leader and the enemy of Shi’a Muslims everywhere. And before long, Iranians rose up and expelled him. Similar charges were made against Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war. And thousands of teenage boys ended up martyring themselves for the cause, clearing mine fields with their bodies to repel their Iraqi foes. More recently, Iran’s leaders have employed this same tactic by referring to the United States as the “World Oppressor”—the same type of evil, Yazid-like dictator, just on a larger scale.

But now the shoe is on the other foot. For years, Iran’s leaders have used the legend of Husayn’s death to rally the masses to fight against the enemies they selected. But in the aftermath of the disputed election, millions of Iranians have finally recognized that the corrupt government that is harming them the most is actually run by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and their fellow hardliners. The rooftop chants of “Allahu Akbar” and “Death to Dictators” are evidence of this social awakening.

The defiance of the corrupt regime has begun. However, Mousavi’s death would be the next important step for this historical allusion to be fulfilled. As a martyr in the line of Husayn, Mousavi could become a symbol with extraordinarily powerful religious legitimacy that should not be underestimated.

Mousavi’s martyrdom could remind committed Iranian Muslims that fighting back against the corrupt regime is not merely a matter of their own political freedom—it’s a matter of the religious principles on which they’ve based their entire lives. According to the values which they hold most sacred, they must be willing to die—if that’s what it takes—in order to defeat their current oppressors.

But so far, despite their courage, the Iranian protesters who have died during the conflict appear to have been tragically unlucky, not declared and deliberate martyrs. Very few, if any, have been willing to follow Husayn’s legendary lead and intentionally sacrifice themselves for the cause.

On the other hand, Mousavi has already publicly proclaimed that he is ready for martyrdom, and he continues to defy the corrupt regime. If he deliberately provokes the regime into killing him while emotions are still high, he could leave an indelible mark on the Iranian psyche. And that could spark a revolution.

Adam Lankford is assistant professor of criminal justice at The University of Alabama and the author of Human Killing Machines: Systematic Indoctrination in Iran, Nazi Germany, Al Qaeda, and Abu Ghraib. Listen to an interview with Dr. Lankford about his book at PsychJourney.

The Pitfalls of Historical Amnesia in the Middle East

By Paul J. Rich

In 1914 the British, largely with Indian troops, landed at Basra at the head of the Persian Gulf and began a disastrous march to Baghdad. They were surrounded by the Turks at Kut and there suffered a defeat that was compared to that of Yorktown. The casualties were enormous.

It is amazing that so little attention has been paid to this invasion and to the subsequent unhappy British occupation of what then were the Turkish provinces of Mesopotamia. The region was of course to become Iraq and the British would struggle with trying to impose their agenda well into the 1930s.

So little is said about this that one would think it was a secret, but there is no lack of information on the subject. There are some classic volumes such A.J. Barker’s The Neglected War: Mesopotamia 1914-18, and Briton Cooper Busch’s Britain and the Persian Gulf and his Britain, India, and the Arabs. In fact, scholars have done such notable work on the period and region that it is frustrating to see how untutored American policy towards the peoples of Iraq has been.

Reading about the attempted consolidation of Middle Eastern straps along Western lines in the past might have prevented some of the mistakes that have been made by the United States in its recent interventions. And there remains a great wealth of original source material to explore should anyone be inclined. One valuable archive is the records of the Mesopotamian Commission after the war, a highly controversial fact-finding tribunal investigating the British blunders during the campaign. Charges that it whitewashed the conduct of high British officials have never been resolved.

In retrospect, the British decision to land at Basra and create Iraq had much to do with the desire of those in charge of the Empire to extend Imperial rule into the Middle East. The Gulf shaikhdoms were already part of that Empire and taking the head of the Gulf and then going on to Baghdad seemed a logical extension. Figures such as Sir Percy Cox and Sir Arnold Wilson were the Colin Powells and Donald Rumsfelds of the period.

Occam’s razor is well applied to the Middle East situation. It is not atomic science to ask that American foreign policy display more sophistication. One simply must know something bout the nuances, the cultures, the ancient animosities, before plunging willy-nilly into marching to Baghdad. We didn’t.

Paul J. Rich is president of the Policy Studies Organization in Washington, D.C., visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and the editor of Iraq and Gertrude Bell's The Arab of Mesopotamia, Iraq and Rupert Hay's Two Years in Kurdistan, Iraq and Eleanor Egan's The War in the Cradle of the World, and the author of the forthcoming Creating the Arabian Gulf: The British Raj and the Invasions of the Gulf.

Deadly, But Not a War: Some Thoughts on the Israeli/Palestinian Conflict

By Ilan Zvi Baron

The debate over Israel’s incursion into Gaza has, predictably, fallen into two general camps. On the one side are those who recognize the intolerable condition of being subject to constant attack by rockets and of Israel’s right to defend itself. On the other are those who view Israel’s actions to be heavy-handed, possibly illegal and consistent with the bellicose policies of the occupation. Both views are problematic.
First, the barrage of crude but deadly missiles that were a daily reminder of the ambitions of Hamas’ military wing clearly required some response. Unfortunately, the incursion was not the right response. The objective to stop these rocket attacks from Gaza into Israel succeeded, but only for long enough to highlight its overall failure. It is far more likely that the goal was about Israel recouping its sense of strength after an embarrassing war in Lebanon against Hezbollah. The idea, however, that Israel could demonstrate its military power and reassert its deterrent capability by attacking a significantly weaker foe is unconvincing.

Second, the Palestinians behind the rocket attacks were inviting a heavy-handed response and anecdotal evidence suggests that they welcomed the Israeli incursion as a way to engage the enemy. This callousness of Hamas’ military wing demonstrates a complete lack of care for the Palestinian people. The related argument that the Israeli occupation is the sole cause of Hamas’ use of terror against Israel is also troubling. Such a claim degrades the Palestinians, suggesting that they are not capable of producing positive social or political change.

The idea that Israeli military strength could somehow will the Palestinians into submission has not worked and will continue not to work but only to provoke. There is, in short, neither a clear military nor political goal that stands a good chance of success which could justify this incursion. For the Palestinians, they have no military capacity to fight Israel. The launching of rockets into civilian areas and the use of suicide bombings attest to little concern over the means by which they fight, but rather a decidedly cruel means/ends morality that is matched by Israel’s policy of collective punishment. Contrary to what the opposing parties want to think, this conflict is anything but a war – it is more of a deadly farce with no winners and only successive losers.

Israel has long claimed that it seeks peaceful relations with its Arab and Palestinian neighbors. In theory there is no reason not to recognize this as a genuine desire. The Palestinians no doubt want the same. Hamas has been dedicated to destroying Israel, but its political wing is pragmatic and could follow the path of Fatah, accept Israel’s de facto existence and the two-state solution. Nevertheless, the inherent mistrust, perpetual reliance on violent measures, an ability to fall victim to the plots of spoilers, and a pathology toward implementing any kind of respectful peaceful relations highlight an absence of politics in any positive meaningful sense. Abba Eban famously said that the Arabs “never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.” He might as well have said this of the Palestinians and Israel.

Ilan Zvi Baron has recently been appointed to a Lectureship in International Political Theory at Durham University and is the author of Justifying the Obligation to Die: War, Ethics, and Political Obligations with Illustrations from Zionism.

At the Borderline of Armageddon

 

By James E. Goodby

The sixth anniversary of 9/11 coincides with a renewed debate about Iraq. The coincidence should remind us that diplomacy has proved more effective than the use of force in containing the nuclear threat.

In my book, At the Borderline of Armageddon (Rowman and Littlefield, 2006) I described how the current administration campaigned for war against Iraq. It claimed that Saddam Hussein was reconstituting a nuclear weapons program which could only be stopped by force. Even when Secretary of State Colin Powell’s own intelligence analysts expressed skepticism, no real effort was made to get to the bottom of the matter. The war decision had been made. 

My book also shows how determined the administration was to dismantle the legal structure for U.S.-Russian cooperation in controlling nuclear weapons. Fundamental changes in the U.S.-Russian relationship justified a different approach to controlling nuclear weapons, but rejecting the whole idea of joint controls was not called for.

The Bush administration came into office saying that arms control agreements were outmoded. But it has become evident in recent years that a U.S.-Russian effort to reduce their own holdings of nuclear weapons to as close to zero as is possible is necessary to block the spread of nuclear weapons to many other nations. That can only be done through verified treaties, which the Bush administration has rejected.

This administration seems unable either to anticipate events or to recall the past. It is oblivious to history. Anyone listing the most bitterly contested issues in today’s public policy debates would certainly include these: Should the United States have invaded Iraq to block its non-existent nuclear weapons program? Should the United States launch a preventive war against Iran to destroy that nation’s nuclear programs? Should U.S. diplomats negotiate with an authoritarian North Korean leader whose people are suffering under his rule? These questions rank among the handful of life-or-death decisions the Bush administration has faced, but U.S. presidents have faced very similar questions before. Their answers were very different from the ones given us by President Bush.

Eisenhower was asked to consider preventive war to block the Soviet Union’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. He refused. Kennedy and Johnson were asked to consider the same action against China’s nascent nuclear weapons program. They understood the folly of that. Reagan said and he believed that the Soviet government was an “Evil Empire,” yet he negotiated with that government because he saw that the nuclear weapon was humanity’s common enemy. Ultimately, Reagan succeeded in eliminating a whole class of nuclear-armed missiles. We are even beginning to see some progress with North Korea, now that diplomacy has been unleashed. The lessons of history are clear. The judgments of these American presidents saved the world from what surely would have been devastation on a grand scale. More diplomacy and less war will improve the world’s chances of escaping nuclear catastrophe.

 

James E. Goodby is a research affiliate with MIT's Program on Science, Technology, and Society, where he dedicates his research to issues involving nuclear weapons. Goodby has served in a variety of diplomatic and policy positions in both Europe and Washington, placing strong emphasis on international security affairs. He is the recipient of the Presidential Distinguished Service Award, the State Department's Superior and Distinguished Honor Award, and the Commander's Cross of the Order of Merit from the German government. In 1995, Goodby received the inaugural Heinz Award in Public Policy.

 

Evangelical-Jewish Relations

By Alan Mittleman

A group of 34 evangelical leaders recently sent President Bush a letter indicating their support for a Palestinian state. Both sides, they claim, “have legitimate rights stretching back for millennia to the lands of Israel/Palestine,” according to an article in the International Herald Tribune (July 29, 2007). Such a declaration would, of course, be unremarkable had it come from a liberal, mainline Protestant body. Coming from the evangelical world, however, makes it noteworthy. The evangelical community has been stalwart in its support for Israel, as well as in its suspicion toward the Palestinians. The signers of this letter, however, claim that the public face of evangelicalism, as a staunchly pro-Israel community, does not do justice to the inner diversity of the community. According to one evangelical leader, Rev. Joel Hunter, most of the community should not be considered Christian Zionists but is “really open” and seeks “justice for both parties.”

The pastors and leaders behind this initiative—who are identified with the growing progressive wing of the evangelical world—intend their message to be heard by Muslims, as well. The letter is being translated into Arabic and sent to Muslims abroad to offset the image of American evangelicals as lock-step followers of maximalist Zionism. 

This display of internal diversity within evangelicalism suggests the healthy dissent of a community come of age. Just as some evangelicals have taken a “liberal” line on the environment, the war in Iraq, or the use of torture, so too here, complicating the public image of the community is not a bad thing. Anyone who supports pluralism and the free exchange of ideas might welcome this intramural dialogue. Although I very much reject their argument—do Palestinian Arabs really have claims reaching back millennia? Millennia? lands of Israel/Palestine?—I recognize their need to make it based on their understanding of the biblical imperative of justice.

Let us be clear, however, this group does not represent a majority. It represents, at best, a vocal minority. Drawing on several surveys of evangelical opinion from 1994-2005, the political scientist John Green finds that in the dispute between Israel and the Palestinians 56% of evangelicals sympathized more with Israel as opposed to 6%, who sympathized more with the Palestinians. (38% had no opinion.) Forty one percent of the general public, by comparison, sympathized with Israel; 13% with the Palestinians; 46% had no opinion. Majority evangelical backing for Israel both internally and comparatively is striking. When asked why they sympathized with Israel, 84% said it was because “God gave Israel to the Jews.” It would be hard to read the Bible without coming to this conclusion, especially if one hews to a non-suspicious approach to the text.

These leaders do not speak for the majority. At best, they speak for the 38% who have no opinion and the 6% whose sympathies lie with the Palestinians. Perhaps more probing into the evangelical majority would reveal nuances, hesitations, or gradations of support for Israel. For my part, I am thankful that the majority stands behind Israel. I do not want evangelicals to support Israel naively or credulously; I want them to support Israel —warts and all—intelligently and with full recognition of the fundamental justice of its cause. 

Alan Mittleman is Director of the Louis Finkelstein Institute for Religious and Social Studies and Professor of Jewish Philosophy at The Jewish Theological Seminary.  His latest book Uneasy Allies? Evangelical and Jewish Relations , co-edited with Byron R. Johnson and Nancy Isserman, will be published by Lexington Books this month.