Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group

Shopping for an Organ Transplant?: The Pitfalls of Medical Tourism

By Katrina A. Bramstedt

In the US, thousands of patients are waiting for a kidney or liver transplant. Sometimes, they get so desperate, they contemplate traveling to a foreign country to buy an organ. In their desperation, patients often don’t think about the pitfalls and ethical problems of organ tourism, and there are many. Some organs are known to come from prisoners who did not give informed consent. Some organs are taken from women who are forced by their husbands to “donate” a kidney or liver tissue to pay a debt. Is this the setting for ethical medical care?

Other problems with organ tourism are issues such as the lack of medical records, or records which are written in a foreign language and unhelpful upon return to the US. Organs are sometimes also contaminated with viruses such as HIV and hepatitis. And what about these medical complications? Who pays for the treatment? What if there is malpractice? Can the patient obtain any recourse? The complexity of organ tourism is immense, clinically, ethically, and legally. So is there another option for patients who need a kidney or liver transplant?

Enter the Good Samaritan. These are people, right here in USA, who are ready and willing to give an organ to a stranger. They have no goal other than “to help”. Their organ gifts are “no strings attached” and often, they never even meet the person who receives their organ. For the Good Samaritan, all that matters is that they have something extra and they want to share it with someone who needs it. In the new book, The Organ Donor Experience: Good Samaritans and the Meaning of Altruism, 22 donors were extensively studied to learn their personalities and motivations for organ donation. In general, these givers are normal, everyday folk, of average means, with a genuine desire to serve their community. Often, they have a lengthy history of volunteerism and their parents did as well. They originate from all fields, law, law enforcement, health care, education, you-name-it. A Good Samaritan could be your neighbor down the street, the clerk at the grocery store, a local taxi driver, or even your bank teller. These people want to give, and with medical, surgical, and psychosocial screenings, they can be lifesavers.

References:

• Bramstedt K.A., Xu J. Checklist: passport, plane ticket, organ transplant. Am J Transplant. 2007 Jul;7(7):1698-701.
• Bramstedt K.A. Ethical minefields in medical tourism. Sonoma Medicine 2011.
• Bramstedt K.A. Steering clear of organ tourism. Kidney Review 2007.

Dr. Katrina A. Bramstedt is a noted medical ethicist associated with California Transplant Donor Network in Oakland, California. She also has a private practice in Marin County where she has performed over 800 ethics consultations and published over 75 articles in medical and bioethics journals. She lectures nationally and internationally and has made numerous appearances on television and radio discussing transplantation and donation. She is the co-author of The Organ Donor Experience: Good Samaritans and the Meaning of Altruism.

After Dominique Strauss-Kahn?

By Sarah Tenney

The recent arrest and resignation of IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn emphasizes the importance of the institution’s legitimacy in the international arena.

Although often overlooked, the most fundamental role of the IMF is to serve as a trusted advisor to country authorities and other international organizations and groups. In this capacity, its staff of only about 2500 enjoys access to the highest government offices and officials in all of its 187 member countries. It has the “ear” of other important international organizations, civil society groups, the academic community, and the media. Indeed, its role as a trusted advisor lies at the heart of all of the IMF’s work and enables it to serve as the pivotal player in efforts to ensure a stable international monetary and financial system.

Over the past 67 years, the IMF has achieved the highest level of global legitimacy not only by recruiting and retaining the “best and the brightest” among the world’s economists, but also by maintaining a sound track record for impartiality, confidentiality, and policy analysis. Its staff and management are well-respected among member states for professionalism, cultural awareness, and diplomatic prowess.

All of this was suddenly called into question on May 14, when the leader of the IMF, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, was arrested on charges of sexual assault. Despite the tenet of the US justice system that the man is “presumed innocent until proved guilty,” the world’s media seems to have gone into a feeding frenzy, and Dr. Strauss-Kahn tendered his resignation to the IMF on May 18, 2011. (1)

While the IMF has been careful to separate the criminal investigation into Dr. Strauss-Kahn’s personal life from the work of the organization, the selection process for the next Managing Director will certainly be a matter for scrutiny. Indeed, the Executive Board was quick to give assurance that the selection process will take place in “an open, merit-based, and transparent manner.”(2)

Perhaps most interesting, the Executive Board has stated that the selection of the next Managing Director will be made without regard to geographic preference. In the period since 1944, convention has dictated that the President of the World Bank is always a citizen of the United States while the Managing Director of the IMF is a European. This informal understanding emerged at a time when these two groupings controlled the global economy and the conviction was that developing countries should not provide the leadership, because they were most likely to need assistance; thus, having a developing country national at the helm could leave the organization vulnerable to possible conflicts of interest.

Clearly, the sovereign debt crisis in Europe and continuing difficulties in the United States have rendered previous assumptions about those mostly likely to need help obsolete. Nevertheless, the United States and the European Union still wield the largest voting shares in the IMF’s Executive Board, and the current frontrunners seem to be Christine Lagarde, finance minister of France, and former UK Prime Minster Gordon Brown.

Regardless of nationality, the next leader of the IMF will have important work to accomplish if further progress is to be made in putting in place a fail-safe early warning system, reining in financial sectors, and promoting greater equality both within and between countries.

In order to accomplish these feats, the next leader will require at a minimum the qualifications set forth by the IMF Executive Board‘s press release of May 20, 2011:

. . . (s)he will be capable of providing strategic vision for the work of a high quality, diverse, and dedicated staff; and will be firmly committed to advancing the goals of the Fund by building consensus on key policy and institutional issues, including through close collaboration with the Executive Board, under whose direction (s)he will fulfill his or her responsibilities. (S)he will have a proven understanding of the Fund and the policy challenges facing the Fund's diverse global membership. (S)he will have a firm commitment to, and an appreciation of, multilateral cooperation and will have a demonstrated capacity to be objective and impartial. (S)he will also be an effective communicator.

Given recent events, the candidate may also need to have an unimpeachable personal background. Surely, the job will require a man or woman with bold conviction, fearless determination, and unparalleled political acumen to lead not only the institution, but also the world community in adjusting to a new and more complex global environment.

NOTES

1. IMF Press Release No.11/187, May 18, 2011.
2. IMF Press Release No. 11/191, May 20, 2011

Sarah Tenney is assistant professor in the Political Science and Criminal Justice Department at The Citadel and the co-editor of the Historical Dictionary of the International Monetary Fund : Third Edition (Scarecrow Press). She was a staff member of the International Monetary Fund from 1987 to 2003.

Bahrain: A Kingdom of Fear and Repression

By Emile Nakhleh

Bahrain, a small island country in the Persian Gulf used to be viewed by the international community as a relatively tolerant, inclusive, and liberal country. Once the “Arab Spring” erupted a few months ago in neighboring Arab countries, pro-reform demonstrations gathered steam in and around Pearl Roundabout in Bahrain demanding political and economic reform. The ruling Al-Khalifa family reacted with brutality and repression, including arrests and firing at protesters, detention of journalists, academics, parliamentarians, medical doctors and health providers, without regard for basic human rights. Within a few short months, Bahrain has become a Saudi satellite—politically and ideologically—and is no longer a shining beacon of tolerance in the Gulf.

Several reasons might explain why Bahrain’s uprising so far has not achieved the same results as in Tunisia and Egypt:

• A small population (barely over half a million)
• Pervasive Saudi influence
• The military and security leadership hails from the ruling family
• A tacit American and international support for al-Khalifa suppression of the uprising because of the stationing of the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, concern about Iran’s influence in the Gulf, and worries about the potential for instability in the oil region.

Amnesty International in a recent briefing paper describes Bahrain as a “human rights disaster” and suggests that the regime suppression of dissent through arbitrary arrests and torture has created an atmosphere of fear and sectarianism. The al-Khalifa family heads a Sunni minority with access to power, privilege, and wealth and rules over a Shia majority that is mostly poor and dispossessed, with minimal access to government jobs and lucrative economic opportunities. Many Shia live in villages and poorer sections of the capital Manama. A few prominent Shia families have cooperated with Al Khalifa and have been amply rewarded with access to wealth and high government positions, including cabinet posts.

Since March 15, 2011, King Hamad has imposed a state of emergency under the rubric of a “State of National Safety,” which has given the security forces “sweeping powers” to arrest and try protesters in special courts for “offences against the state” with no “explicit human rights safeguards.” Under SNS regulations, hundreds of people have been detained, tortured, and injured. At least 30 protesters have been killed, according to media and international human rights reports. Many others have “disappeared” by agents of the regime in the middle of the night without a word to their families or access to legal defense. More recently two al-Wefaq parliamentarians, Matar Ibrahim Matar and Jawad Fairuz, were arrested by masked armed agents of the regime and whisked away without minimal due process. Their families were not informed of their whereabouts.

Regime repression of protesters and human rights activists—Sunni and Shia—continues unabated. More doctors are being tried in special tribunals for alleged “crimes against the state.” In reality, they were arrested and tried for providing medical help to those injured and beaten by security agents.

Talk of possible dialogue with the opposition, which was first voiced by the Crown Prince and the King’s son Shaykh Salman, has all but evaporated with the advent of at least 1,000 Saudi troops into Bahrain. These troops, including a few from Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, came to Bahrain as part of the so-called Desert Shield. They crossed the causeway that connects Bahrain with Saudi Arabia under the Gulf Cooperation Council collective security agreement. The Saudi leadership was extremely distressed by the downfall of Tunisia’s Bin Ali and Egypt’s Mubarak and therefore decided not to spearhead a “counterrevolution” to safeguard the Bahraini and other Sunni Gulf ruling families. The Saudi action reflects Riyadh’s claim that the “Arab Spring” is a threat to internal stability and that Iran was stirring Shia opposition in Bahrain, and potentially in Saudi Arabia.

Three key points underpin the on-going crisis in Bahrain:

• The current protest movement calling for government accountability and reinstatement of the constitution is decades old; in fact, it goes back to 1975 when the ruling family dissolved the National Assembly and suspended the 1973 constitution.
• The movement is not driven by sectarianism. Because the majority of the population is Shia, large numbers of the protesters are therefore Shia. Sunni reformers, however, are also actively involved in opposing regime repression and have been at the forefront of the reform movement.
• The Shia community is diverse politically, socially, and economically and has not voted as a bloc. Nor is the Shia community beholden to Iran. Bahraini Shia over the years have turned to Iraqi and Lebanese Shia Grand Ayatollahs for emulation, and although several prominent Bahraini Shia leaders have studied in Iran, the Shia community does not view Iranian senior clerics as their sources of emulation or marja'.

Bahraini protesters, like their counterparts in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Libya, Syria, and elsewhere, are as diverse as the wider Bahraini society. They are villagers, city dwellers, laborers, farmers, professionals, teachers, health providers, and government employees. They seek dignity, justice, respect, and the opportunity to live as free citizens. Many of their postings on the Internet, Facebook, and Twitter reflect their desire to have the freedom to dream for a better life and pursue their dreams without repression or restrictions on their freedoms to speak, to create, to travel, and to associate with others. They also aspire to join the rising Arab generation as a peaceful force of change in their societies.

Contrary to Saudi and Bahraini government claims, calls for reform are not a Shia thing or a recipe for sectarianism. Media reports indicate the sectarianism argument has been pushed by the Saudi and Bahraini leadership in order to justify their actions against Bahraini peaceful protesters. Many Bahrainis view the main goal of the Saudi presence in the country is to persecute the Shia community and silence all opposition voices.

The three key ingredients of the envisioned compromise involve a return to the 1973 constitution, a re-establishment of a popularly elected national Assembly, which the king’s father dissolved in 1975, and dissolving the current government, which has been headed by the king’s uncle, Shaykh Khalifa, since independence in 1971. The prime minister is perhaps the most disliked senior member of Al Khalifa because of perceived corruption, nepotism, and repression, according to academic analysis and media reports. Many Bahrainis also view him as a staunch opponent to reform within the ruling family. The opposition movement maintains that implementing these demands will lead to transparent and accountable government, a just distribution of wealth, recognition of freedoms of speech, assembly, and the press, and an independent judiciary.

The pro-reform demands are in response to economic, political, and social grievances, which many Bahrainis have endured for decades. I have discussed many of these grievances in the first edition of my book, Bahrain: Political Development in a Modernizing Society, which Lexington Books published in 1976. These grievances, including the same prime minister, continue to exist in the country today.

Emile Nakhleh is the author of Bahrain: Political Development in a Modernizing Society (Lexington Books, 2011).

A Tale of Two Cities: Hong Kong and Dubai

By Thorsten Botz-Bornstein

Celebrating Disappearance/Appearance

Hong Kong and Dubai have more in common than towers wearing architectural brandnames. Being hubs between what has commonly been called the “East” and the “West,” both cities have been submitted to spectacular developments that transformed them within a few decades from fishing villages deprived of any urban history into international metropolises. Both cities possess port locations that are central to trade and both cities have attracted massive international capital as well as large expat communities. Neither Hong Kong nor Dubai occupies a central position within its respective region as a producer of goods, but both function as centers of facilitation and are rather para-sites than sites. Dubai is the third most important re-export centre in the world just after Hong Kong and Singapore. Neither Hong Kong nor Dubai has transport rivers and, at present, neither city has a significant amount of raw materials. Though the foundation of modern Dubai depended very much on initial oil reserves that are no longer available, it is correct to maintain that both cities owe their present existence to obstacles that forced them to invest in non-traditional economies. Finally, both cities came to symbolize globalization and an extreme form of urbanity based on aggressive international capitalism.

Attracting international investments, but little “culture” (and being deprived of local cultural resources), for a long time, Hong Kong’s entire existence as a city depended on financial markets. Dubai’s existence can be defined in the same terms. As a matter of fact, Dubai has been quite commonly called “the Hong Kong of the Middle East.” Neither Hong Kong nor Dubai are “real” cities in the conventional sense because neither has preserved its historical context.

Hong Kong and the Celebration of Disappearance

In the 1980s, when Hong Kong owned the world’s largest container cargo terminals, the city’s image was that of a cultural desert determined by superficiality, internal fragmentation, consumerism, and the lack of urban history or local identity. Today all this is seen as typical for Dubai. However, a “cultural turn” promoting a local ethos based on a common language and a particular geographical location, seemingly reversed Hong Kong’s cultural situation in the 1980s, creating a film industry focusing on local stories and local people that would become famous as the Hollywood of the East. In popular music, Cantopop has been a local genre since the 1970s. This, together with a belief in typical Hong Kong virtues such as rationality and discipline, would give Hong Kong the cultural identity it needed, which changed the perception of the city. This individualist cultural system was even strong enough to oppose big businesses.

In a way, Hong Kong became a “postmodern” city: Hong Kong is neither “pre-modern” because it does not exhibit a continuous string of histories, traditions, and culture, nor is it “modern” in the sense of de-cultured, or simply functionally economic. Mike Featherstone has called this type of city, which decides to return to culture, style, and decoration, “postmodern” because here cultural elements are most often “decontextualized, simulated, reduplicated and continually renewed and restyled.”

It is for these precise reasons that it is wrong to characterize Hong Kong’s cultural ascendance as a straightforward process of acculturation. Ackbar Abbas describes Hong Kong’s “cultural self-invention” as a device that is linked, in a paradoxical fashion, to a complex concept of “disappearance,” which comprises at least three things: First, “disappearance” addresses Hong Kong’s frantic cycle of construction, demolition, and reconstruction that yields the impression of a constant disappearance of architectural substance. Second, as Hong Kong has been submitted to more and more aggressive and advanced stages of globalization, the newly built Hong Kong architecture remains restricted to that of the brandname kind. This tendency creates a global environment that, once again, threatens to erase the newly achieved local culture and makes the city “invisible” within an international context, letting topical cultural experience disappear into an anonymous international system. This internationalization concerns also the film industry as its productions have been more and more geared towards international (and Mainland-Chinese) markets. The third meaning of disappearance has to do with the “real” disappearance of Hong Kong as it is taken over by China and will presumably, sooner or later, be absorbed into an oversized motherland.

The first two developments are not unique to Hong Kong, but what is unique is the way in which Hong Kong copes with them. As a matter of fact, Abbas links all three developments (which partly overlap and are difficult to disentangle) to the nostalgic experience of the disappearance of colonial space, which created, in his opinion, not simply a space from which “the colonial” has disappeared, but rather a “colonial space of disappearance.” Abbas’ point is that “disappearance” does not lead to disappearance at all, but rather to a sustained “aesthetics of disappearance” creating, in the case of Hong Kong, the particular cultural space of a “floating identity.” Hong Kong cinema, for example, is eager to keep pace with a subject that is always at the point of disappearing.

Dubai and the Colonial Space of Appearance

Hong Kong will not disappear but it has installed its existence within a peculiar aesthetics of disappearance. Abbas actually believes that Hong Kong will remain almost unchanged for another fifty years. The floating state of Hong Kong’s existence makes it a true forerunner of Dubai, which seems to be suspended in a similar state of floating existence, though at the opposite end of the spectrum. Dubai will simply not appear. For this city, the act of becoming has been charged with such complicated connotations that “becoming” seems to have been eternalized. While Hong Kong revels in what is (almost) no longer there, Dubai revels in what is not yet there. While Hong Kong engenders the feeling of a déjà disparu rooted in an irretrievable, colonial ex-past, Dubai installs itself in a perpetual not yet there that speaks to us through the veil of an indiscernible ex-future.

Dubai has been financed by colossal debt from international banks and its neighbor Abu Dhabi, but “Dubai as an event” has from the beginning been staged as a spectacular and eternally postponed “not yet there.” Apartments were sold long before they were built and would change their owners five times. While in Hong Kong, property speculation causes the absurd state of affairs that sooner or later any building, no matter how new or monumental it is, will vanish from the map, in Dubai maps have been written in the future tense from the beginning. We assist in the creation of Borges’ map that covers the earth because the map is supposed to be the earth. At the airports of Dubai and Abu Dhabi expensive color catalogues of the most famous architectural attractions are handed to tourists for free though a large part of the buildings presented in these catalogues do not yet exist. They are scheduled for the (sometimes very distant) future. The only positive impression that these pictures yield is that of a déjà vu of a not yet there.

Thorsten Botz-Bornstein is assistant professor of philosophy at the Gulf University for Science and Technology in Kuwait and the author of Films and Dreams: Tarkovsky, Bergman, Sokurov, Kubrick, and Wong Kar-Wai (2007), Aesthetics and Politics of Space in Russia and Japan: A Comparative Philosophical Study (2009), and The Cool-Kawaii: Afro-Japanese Aesthetics and New World Modernity (2010).

Anti-Nuclear, Anti-American: Is a Pan-Asianist Japan on the Rise Again?

By Christopher W. A. Szpilman

Pan-Asianism crops up in most unexpected places. Take the case of one Hiroshi Takashi. Hirose (b. 1943), a self-styled expert on nuclear energy, is a best-selling if controversial Japanese author. Since the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, if not earlier, he has been crowing on about a looming nuclear catastrophe and, in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear reactor disaster, he has emerged as a leading critic of Japan’s nuclear energy program. Although I agree with Hirose that nuclear power is replete with danger, I must note that his premises are largely false and his reasoning fallacious. But my goal here is not to dwell on the content of the anti-Western and anti-Semitic conspiracy theories Hirose propounds. I merely want to note that he can be legitimately described as a pan-Asianist. I realized this after I read Hirose’s Japan’s Destiny, Asia’s Destiny, published in 2004.

In this book, echoing the views of Japan’s prewar pan-Asianists, Hirose bemoans the moral decay and vulgarity of the United States and deplores what he believes is the slavish dependence of the Japanese establishment on America. Noting that America has fallen into moral decrepitude, is “spiritually stagnant,” and weakened politically by its military overstretch throughout the world, Hirose argues that “at long last we, the Japanese, have now a chance to lead Asia independently. No better opportunity than this will ever come our way….We must view Asia as our new paradise” (p. 374).

As Hirose sees it, it is the pernicious American influence that prevented Japan from remaining a genuine Asian country in the first place, because it caused the Japanese to lose empathy with their fellow-Asians. “After the war in Japan,” he says, “the feeling of friendship and solidarity with Asians was largely lost” (p. 382), presumably on account of the shameless deal with the United States by Japan’s leaders who swapped their (and Japan’s) Asian soul in exchange for material prosperity.

The conclusion is obvious. The long-lost empathy with their fellow-Asians can be regained, says Hirose, only if Japan “renounces its alliance with the United States.” Only then, he insists, Japan will be able to become the leader of Asia.

Such expressions of solidarity with Asia may come as a surprise when voiced by an anti-nuclear campaigner (for surely the problem of nuclear energy is not only limited to Asia but is of concern to all mankind), but they have much in common both with the views of many idealistic Japanese volunteers working to help the needy in war-afflicted Asian countries and, on the opposite extreme of the political spectrum, with the views of Ishihara Shintarô, a populist politician whose Pan-Asianist views we document in our Pan-Asianism: a Documentary History. Hirose’s case provides further evidence for the great relevance of Pan-Asianism to understanding modern Japan and Asia.

Christopher W. A. Szpilman is professor of modern Japanese history and international relations at Kyushu Sangyo University, Fukuoka. He is the co-editor of Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History, Volumes 1 and 2.

Ending the Benign Neglect Myth: President Obama's Trip to Brazil

By Britta H. Crandall

President Obama will make a historic visit to Brazil this month where he is slated to meet with his newly elected Brazilian counterpart, President Dilma Rousseff. The White House described Obama’s visit to Brazil as a chance to “advance our efforts to work as equal partners” to address the challenges facing Latin America. Brazil is becoming an equal partner indeed. Its economy is the world’s seventh largest; it is a global leader in the export of iron, soy, orange juice, and aircraft; and the 2007 discovery of an estimated eight to twelve billion barrels of light crude oil off its coast poise it to become a leading oil exporter. Further, the country has clearly made the successful transition from a military regime to a vibrant democracy. The choice of Brazil for Obama’s Latin America trip undoubtedly reflects the ascent of the South American giant. And for some, Obama’s visit potentially represents a long-overdue interest in Brazil on behalf of the U.S. government.

The United States has long been accused of adopting a policy of “benign neglect” toward Brazil. In recent decades, for example, the White House has not cooperated with Brazil at high levels as it did during World War II and has not meddled in Brazilian domestic affairs as it did in the 1960s. Many U.S. policymakers and the public alike seemingly have very little concept of U.S. policy toward Brazil. One previous State Department official even referred to Brazil as the “black hole” of U.S. foreign diplomacy given its size and significance in relation to the low degree of engagement and attention that emanate from the U.S. government. The White House, as opposed to the Palacio do Planalto in Brasilia, is commonly blamed for this lack of high-level cooperation between the two governments.

However, bilateral engagement is a two-way street. It takes two to tango, or in this case, samba. Rather than benign neglect from Washington, it is a lack of common interests that limit U.S. engagement with Brazil. Up until the 21st century, with only a few exceptions, Brazil was not strong, problematic, or threatening enough to bring its own issues to the table aside from a steady quest for increased economic aid, and it did not have the relative power to serve as an effective military or economic partner for the United States. Brazil’s foreign policy tradition emphasizing economic development and national sovereignty further limited the potential areas for engagement with Washington.

However, the erosion of the power gap between the United States and Brazil begun in earnest in the 21st century is beginning to have dramatic effects on the bilateral relationship. The less-asymmetrical relationship means that the two countries’ range of policy concerns is beginning to see increased overlap. Brazil’s role as an energy supplier will mean more engagement with the Obama administration as it embarks on a new energy policy. Brazil has become a global leader in the areas of international environmental protection and international trade. Moreover, as the United States addresses its diminished influence in Latin America, the growing importance of Brazil’s role as a moderate voice in the region will also mean ongoing engagement with Washington.

The simple yet powerful role of Brazilian interest in U.S. ties should not be overlooked. President Rousseff’s greater willingness to engage the United States opens up a world of opportunities for bilateral cooperation. President Obama’s trip, then, represents a new opportunity for the United States not because of a long overdue U.S. interest in Brazil, but because of the new openness and pragmatism of the Brazilian government, fostered by the rise of Brazil’s economic and geopolitical prowess.

Britta H. Crandall is adjunct professor of political science at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies and the author of Hemispheric Giants: The Misunderstood History of U.S.-Brazilian Relations (Rowman & Littlefield 2011).

World Heritage Sites: Places of Conflict, or of Peace?

By Michael A. Di Giovine

UNESCO’s World Heritage sites, particularly those in hotspots of geopolitical conflict, have been in the news this past month. The Wall Street Journal published a photo essay on some of the most recently designated sites. And while the Palestinian Authority reportedly has nominated Bethlehem’s Church of the Nativity—believed to be Jesus’ birthplace—to the prestigious World Heritage List, Cambodians and Thais have engaged in bloody shootouts that have left nearly 10 dead over the remote Khmer temple of Preah Vihear. What are these sites and why do they captivate the imaginations, and ideologies, of so many people?

Ratified in 1972, the World Heritage Convention designates local places of historical, cultural, or artistic interest as “universal heritage.” In The Heritage-scape: UNESCO, World Heritage, and Tourism, I argue that this is not empty political maneuvering, but rather a way to foster “peace in the minds of men”, as the Preamble to UNESCO’s Constitution urges, by creating a vast heritage-scape that is bound together by these places of universal significance. Mixing such different sites together, the heritage-scape makes it clear that what unifies all of us is our diversity.

Why do countries agree to “give up” their locality to the universality of the heritage-scape, and adopt the costly regulations UNESCO imposes? Contrary to public belief, a designation does not win the country funding—which is disbursed on a case-by-case basis for training. Rather, these countries respond to the prestige factor associated with site designation.

Just being on the List not only adds value to a nation-state (“we have one of the most important places in the world!”), but allows some of the smallest countries to be counted with the big ones, equating lesser-known monuments like Preah Vihear with popular places such as Venice and Angkor Wat. Without discounting any of the good intensions on the part of the Palestinian Authority, this certainly is a motivating factor: getting on the list means sitting at the same table as other countries; it is one step closer to being recognized as a legitimate state. The fact that Palestine has chosen a (non-Muslim) site important to many Westerners to represent itself on the global stage is therefore no accident; rather, it is a way of claiming to share in Western heritage, and to be its ally rather than its enemy.

While Palestine is betting on a site that is not fully considered “Palestinian” by its people, most World Heritage sites are deeply rooted in the culture and ideology of a nation-state. Many, like Preah Vihear, are claimed by multiple countries. A 9th-century monastery straddling a long-contested portion of the Thai-Cambodian border (its main structure is in Cambodia, but it’s only accessible through Thailand), Preah Vihear was designated for Cambodia in 2008 after a deal was brokered between the now-deposed Thai government of Thaksin Shinawatra and Cambodia’s Hun Sen. The Thai opposition party immediately stoked intense local feelings for Preah Vihear, setting in motion a series of uprisings and coups that toppled Shinawatra’s government and continues to this day.

UNESCO could have handled the situation differently by not attributing an “owner” country to Preah Vihear (like Jerusalem), or, better, by requiring both countries to share the temple (there are already several so-called “transnational sites”). The latter would have the added value of diplomatically illustrating UNESCO’s peacemaking claims of “unity in diversity.” Provided it joins the World Heritage Convention, the Palestinian Authority’s request can provide UNESCO with a second chance to truly foster peace diplomatically; let’s hope the Church of the Nativity fares better than Preah Vihear—it has unfortunately seen enough combat already.

Michael A. Di Giovine is a Ph.D. candidate in the department of anthropology at the University of Chicago, a former tour operator, and the author of The Heritage-scape: UNESCO, World Heritage, and Tourism. He is currently researching heritage, pilgrimage and cultural revitalization associated with the cult of Catholic saint and stigmatic, Padre Pio of Pietrelcina.

Katyn - Step-by-Step Gradualism

By Joanna A. Gorska

Katyń is one of the most notorious issues in Polish history and Polish-Russian relations. The incident involved the execution of 22,000 Polish prisoners of war by the Soviet NKVD at Katyń and other camps in 1940. Russian authorities have repeatedly refused to recognize those killed at Katyń as victims of political reprisals and to rehabilitate them. In March 2005, the Russian investigation was officially closed, with no one charged, and without identifying the Katyń massacre as genocide or a war crime. As expected, the inconclusiveness of the Russian inquiry and its failure to establish a chain of responsibility provoked a public outcry in Poland.

A potentially new chapter in Polish-Russian relations on Katyń opened in April 2010 with the tragic plane crash that took the lives of Poland’s top officials, including President Lech Kaczyński, who were travelling to Smolensk to attend Katyń commemoration ceremonies. Russia’s quick response to the accident, particularly its involvement in an investigation into the plane crash and the support that it offered to relatives of those killed, appeared to have provided a new impetus for the bilateral dialogue on the events of 1940. The plane crash raised the visibility of the Katyń massacre in the Russian media and within Russian society. More broadly, on the policy front, Russian authorities showed growing willingness to accommodate Poland’s preferences on Katyń. For example, the Russian Supreme Court ordered the Moscow City Court to consider an appeal by the Polish group Memoriał to declassify the decision of Russian military prosecutors to close the Katyń investigation. Russian officials also agreed to release additional documents pertaining to the Katyń killings, which were handed over to the acting Polish president, Bronisław Komorowski, in May 2010. Significantly, in late November 2010, Russia’s State Duma proposed a resolution to recognize the events of Katyń as a crime of the Stalinist regime.

However, this shift in Russia’s policy on Katyń will likely be limited in scope. On the strategic policy level, Russian authorities are likely to continue the policy of opposing the equation of the Katyń killings with genocide or war crimes and refusing to grant compensation for crimes committed by the Soviet Union. Indeed, in a note submitted to the Strasbourg Court of Human Rights, which is considering a claim from relatives of the Katyń victims, Russian authorities have argued that they are under no duty to explain the ‘Katyń events.’ Likewise, the Polish authorities are unlikely to deviate from the established policy course on Katyń, which aims at concluding the investigation, obtaining financial compensation for the wrongs suffered from the Soviet Union, and commemorating those killed by the NKVD. The persisting conflict of primary objectives between Poland and Russia on Katyń and the countries’ limited willingness to make substantial policy adjustments on the issue will allow only for incremental and limited changes. Indeed, as President Komorowski stated with reference to Katyń in the run-up to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s visit to Poland in December 2010: "This issue requires considerable effort and a consistent policy aimed not only at reconciliation but also setting some conditions, which would make this reconciliation and cooperation credible."

Joanna A. Gorska currently works for London-based risk management consultancy Control Risks, previously taught at Oxford University, held research positions at NATO Parliamentary Assembly as well as the European Commission, and is the author of Dealing with a Juggernaut: Analyzing Poland's Policy toward Russia, 1989-2009.

Nigeria: Closer to the Brink?

By John Campbell

The breakdown of an elite power-sharing agreement in the run-up to the Nigeria’s 2011 presidential elections increases the risk of regional and ethnic confrontation. The key to avoiding this tragic outcome is for the country’s political elites to forswear self-serving appeals to ethnic, religious, or regional identities and to ensure credible elections.

Africa’s most populous nation, Nigeria was created by the British in 1914 by cobbling together people never before part of the same entity, including some 350 ethnic groups, each with its own language. Despite an Islamic presence since the Middle Ages, the country is also now roughly divided between the two religions, causing tension in some regions, especially where religious and ethnic boundaries coincide.

After the 1998 death of the last military dictator, the ruling elites operating within the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) developed an unwritten power-sharing understanding, called “zoning,” to manage these divisions. The PDP presidential candidate came to rotate between elites from the predominately Christian South and the predominately Muslim North. If the presidential candidate was Christian, then the vice-presidential candidate was Muslim, and vice versa. The elites ensured that their candidates always won elections, and the Nigerian public increasingly stayed home.

Zoning has been challenged before. Olusegun Obasanjo, a Christian Yoruba from the southwest and president from 1999 to 2007, tried twice to change the rules. In 2003, when the presidency was first to revert to a Northern Muslim, he used the powers of the presidency to “renegotiate” the terms of zoning to every eight years instead of every four. In 2006, he tried again to set aside zoning and retain the presidency. Although this time he was blocked by the elites, he managed to impose on the PDP his chosen presidential candidate, Umaru Yar’Adua, a sickly Hausa-Fulani Muslim from Katsina in the North. He also selected Goodluck Jonathan, a Christian from the South, to be the PDP’s vice-presidential candidate. The PDP rigged them into office in 2007, leaving indifferent a public already largely alienated from the political process.

However, in May 2010, Yar’Adua died, making Jonathan the president. Under zoning the North should hold the presidency until 2015. Many expected Jonathan to fill out the rest of Yar’adua’s term and then stand aside for a Northern candidate.

Instead, Jonathan is running in 2011, making it an electoral race of one or more Northern Muslims against a Southern Christian, dividing the elites. Unlike in 2007 when all of the principal presidential candidates were Northern Muslims, voting and election results will matter to a population for whom ethnicity and religion—not national identity—are paramount, and there will be a choice.

Thus, it is imperative that the elections be credible. The new chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission commands respect, and following his recommendations, Election Day will likely be postponed to April to allow for more preparation. But, in a huge country with a deteriorating infrastructure where elites—not voters—usually determine political outcomes, there are enormous challenges. With the end of zoning, the elites are fragmenting and their behavior is harder to predict in a country where politics can be violent. Yet if political figures appeal to ethnic and religious identities for their own short-term advantage, they risk igniting a tinderbox of rivalries that could lead to widespread violence serious enough to challenge an already very weak state. That scenario raises the potential for intervention by the military “to save the state.”

John Campbell is the Ralph Bunche Senior Fellow for Africa Policy Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. He entered service twice in Nigeria, from 1988–1990 as political counselor and from 2004–2007 as U.S. ambassador. He is the author of Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (Rowman & Littlefield, 2010).

Poland's Foreign Policy toward Russia: Energy Security

By Joanna A. Gorska

Poland and Russia signed the so-called ‘contract of the century’ on bilateral gas trade in the 1990s. Since then, Polish authorities have continually spoken of the need to secure alternative gas deliveries in order to reduce Poland’s dependence on imports from the eastern direction. Developments in recent years have shown that, contrary to the arguments put forward in policy discourse in Poland, disruptions in gas supplies from Russia derive mainly from disputes between Moscow and its immediate western neighbors, rather than Russia flexing its energy muscle vis-à-vis Europe. This was exemplified by gas supplies being cut off to Ukraine in January 2009, which led to a fall in exports to Poland by 11%, Hungary by 23% and Romania by 33%. More recently, in June 2010, European importers received reduced volumes of Russian gas due to a dispute between Russia and Belarus over Minsk’s unpaid gas debt. The Russia-Ukraine conflict appears to have been temporarily resolved following a bilateral agreement on gas pricing in April 2010, but its re-emergence is possible in the face of Kiev’s opposition to Russia strengthening its control over the Ukrainian pipeline network or a fall of the pro-Yanukovych government in Kiev. Similarly, while Russia and Belarus signed a supplementary gas contract in July 2010, its future depends on Belarus’ uninterrupted gas payments and the state of bilateral relations regarding a host of other political and economic issues.

These recent developments highlight the necessity to diversify not only the sources of gas supply to Poland but also transit routes. The Nord Stream pipeline, which will deliver Russian gas to Germany through the Baltic Sea, emerges as a viable gas transit alternative not only for western Europe but also for Poland. This option has not, however, been fully or objectively considered by Polish authorities, even though Nord Stream will inevitably reduce the importance and bargaining power of the current transit states in central and eastern Europe, including Poland.

Indeed, many Polish politicians have vehemently opposed Warsaw’s participation in the Nord Stream project, emphasizing high political and financial costs involved. In the political sphere, they have spoken of Europe’s increasing dependence on gas deliveries from the east, with some European Union member states (such as Estonia, Latvia, Finland and Slovakia) being completely dependent on Russian gas. However, the argument about uni-directional dependence is largely unfounded and it is more accurate to speak of inter-dependence in trade relations between Russia and western Europe. Indeed, up to 20% of Russia’s budget depends on the gas trade and some 90% of Russia’s gas exports are destined for the European market. As such, there are substantial economic constraints on Moscow’s willingness and ability to limit the gas flow to Europe, especially through Nord Stream.

In addition, the claims about significant costs involved in Poland’s potential participation in the Nord Stream project appear unsubstantiated, particularly if compared with the alternative proposition to build the second leg of the Yamal pipeline on Polish territory or the Amber pipeline through the Baltic States. While these projects represent an optimal solution in terms of transit route diversification away from Ukraine, they are unrealistic given the number of transit countries involved, progressing work on Nord Stream and Gazprom’s explicit opposition to the projects.

Poland’s participation in Nord Stream should not, however, limit diversification attempts on other fronts. In the longer term, disruptions in Russian gas supplies may stem from Moscow’s inability to deliver contracted gas volumes to the European market. While the ongoing academic debate about the future trajectory of Russia’s gas production is inconclusive, certain developments breed concerns about Moscow’s capacity to meet contractual obligations. They include, inter alia, Russia’s recently concluded gas contracts with China and Japan as well as a projected rise in domestic gas demand in Russia (forecasted to increase by 8.5% in 2010-19). This, coupled with rising gas consumption in Europe (by 23% over the past decade), reinforces Polish plans to construct an LNG plant and a nuclear power station as a means of strengthening the country’s energy security.

Overall, an objective assessment of Poland’s energy security, devoid of historical thinking that is so prevalent in debates about Warsaw’s Ostpolitik, points to the option of Poland participating in regional energy initiatives, including the Nord Stream project. In the current situation, the trans-Baltic pipeline is the most solid guarantee of uninterrupted and sufficient supplies of Russian gas to Poland.

Joanna A. Gorska currently works for London-based risk management consultancy Control Risks, previously taught at Oxford University, held research positions at NATO Parliamentary Assembly as well as the European Commission, and is the author of Dealing with a Juggernaut: Analyzing Poland's Policy toward Russia, 1989-2009.