Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group

A Tale of Two Cities: Hong Kong and Dubai

By Thorsten Botz-Bornstein

Celebrating Disappearance/Appearance

Hong Kong and Dubai have more in common than towers wearing architectural brandnames. Being hubs between what has commonly been called the “East” and the “West,” both cities have been submitted to spectacular developments that transformed them within a few decades from fishing villages deprived of any urban history into international metropolises. Both cities possess port locations that are central to trade and both cities have attracted massive international capital as well as large expat communities. Neither Hong Kong nor Dubai occupies a central position within its respective region as a producer of goods, but both function as centers of facilitation and are rather para-sites than sites. Dubai is the third most important re-export centre in the world just after Hong Kong and Singapore. Neither Hong Kong nor Dubai has transport rivers and, at present, neither city has a significant amount of raw materials. Though the foundation of modern Dubai depended very much on initial oil reserves that are no longer available, it is correct to maintain that both cities owe their present existence to obstacles that forced them to invest in non-traditional economies. Finally, both cities came to symbolize globalization and an extreme form of urbanity based on aggressive international capitalism.

Attracting international investments, but little “culture” (and being deprived of local cultural resources), for a long time, Hong Kong’s entire existence as a city depended on financial markets. Dubai’s existence can be defined in the same terms. As a matter of fact, Dubai has been quite commonly called “the Hong Kong of the Middle East.” Neither Hong Kong nor Dubai are “real” cities in the conventional sense because neither has preserved its historical context.

Hong Kong and the Celebration of Disappearance

In the 1980s, when Hong Kong owned the world’s largest container cargo terminals, the city’s image was that of a cultural desert determined by superficiality, internal fragmentation, consumerism, and the lack of urban history or local identity. Today all this is seen as typical for Dubai. However, a “cultural turn” promoting a local ethos based on a common language and a particular geographical location, seemingly reversed Hong Kong’s cultural situation in the 1980s, creating a film industry focusing on local stories and local people that would become famous as the Hollywood of the East. In popular music, Cantopop has been a local genre since the 1970s. This, together with a belief in typical Hong Kong virtues such as rationality and discipline, would give Hong Kong the cultural identity it needed, which changed the perception of the city. This individualist cultural system was even strong enough to oppose big businesses.

In a way, Hong Kong became a “postmodern” city: Hong Kong is neither “pre-modern” because it does not exhibit a continuous string of histories, traditions, and culture, nor is it “modern” in the sense of de-cultured, or simply functionally economic. Mike Featherstone has called this type of city, which decides to return to culture, style, and decoration, “postmodern” because here cultural elements are most often “decontextualized, simulated, reduplicated and continually renewed and restyled.”

It is for these precise reasons that it is wrong to characterize Hong Kong’s cultural ascendance as a straightforward process of acculturation. Ackbar Abbas describes Hong Kong’s “cultural self-invention” as a device that is linked, in a paradoxical fashion, to a complex concept of “disappearance,” which comprises at least three things: First, “disappearance” addresses Hong Kong’s frantic cycle of construction, demolition, and reconstruction that yields the impression of a constant disappearance of architectural substance. Second, as Hong Kong has been submitted to more and more aggressive and advanced stages of globalization, the newly built Hong Kong architecture remains restricted to that of the brandname kind. This tendency creates a global environment that, once again, threatens to erase the newly achieved local culture and makes the city “invisible” within an international context, letting topical cultural experience disappear into an anonymous international system. This internationalization concerns also the film industry as its productions have been more and more geared towards international (and Mainland-Chinese) markets. The third meaning of disappearance has to do with the “real” disappearance of Hong Kong as it is taken over by China and will presumably, sooner or later, be absorbed into an oversized motherland.

The first two developments are not unique to Hong Kong, but what is unique is the way in which Hong Kong copes with them. As a matter of fact, Abbas links all three developments (which partly overlap and are difficult to disentangle) to the nostalgic experience of the disappearance of colonial space, which created, in his opinion, not simply a space from which “the colonial” has disappeared, but rather a “colonial space of disappearance.” Abbas’ point is that “disappearance” does not lead to disappearance at all, but rather to a sustained “aesthetics of disappearance” creating, in the case of Hong Kong, the particular cultural space of a “floating identity.” Hong Kong cinema, for example, is eager to keep pace with a subject that is always at the point of disappearing.

Dubai and the Colonial Space of Appearance

Hong Kong will not disappear but it has installed its existence within a peculiar aesthetics of disappearance. Abbas actually believes that Hong Kong will remain almost unchanged for another fifty years. The floating state of Hong Kong’s existence makes it a true forerunner of Dubai, which seems to be suspended in a similar state of floating existence, though at the opposite end of the spectrum. Dubai will simply not appear. For this city, the act of becoming has been charged with such complicated connotations that “becoming” seems to have been eternalized. While Hong Kong revels in what is (almost) no longer there, Dubai revels in what is not yet there. While Hong Kong engenders the feeling of a déjà disparu rooted in an irretrievable, colonial ex-past, Dubai installs itself in a perpetual not yet there that speaks to us through the veil of an indiscernible ex-future.

Dubai has been financed by colossal debt from international banks and its neighbor Abu Dhabi, but “Dubai as an event” has from the beginning been staged as a spectacular and eternally postponed “not yet there.” Apartments were sold long before they were built and would change their owners five times. While in Hong Kong, property speculation causes the absurd state of affairs that sooner or later any building, no matter how new or monumental it is, will vanish from the map, in Dubai maps have been written in the future tense from the beginning. We assist in the creation of Borges’ map that covers the earth because the map is supposed to be the earth. At the airports of Dubai and Abu Dhabi expensive color catalogues of the most famous architectural attractions are handed to tourists for free though a large part of the buildings presented in these catalogues do not yet exist. They are scheduled for the (sometimes very distant) future. The only positive impression that these pictures yield is that of a déjà vu of a not yet there.

Thorsten Botz-Bornstein is assistant professor of philosophy at the Gulf University for Science and Technology in Kuwait and the author of Films and Dreams: Tarkovsky, Bergman, Sokurov, Kubrick, and Wong Kar-Wai (2007), Aesthetics and Politics of Space in Russia and Japan: A Comparative Philosophical Study (2009), and The Cool-Kawaii: Afro-Japanese Aesthetics and New World Modernity (2010).

Anti-Nuclear, Anti-American: Is a Pan-Asianist Japan on the Rise Again?

By Christopher W. A. Szpilman

Pan-Asianism crops up in most unexpected places. Take the case of one Hiroshi Takashi. Hirose (b. 1943), a self-styled expert on nuclear energy, is a best-selling if controversial Japanese author. Since the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, if not earlier, he has been crowing on about a looming nuclear catastrophe and, in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear reactor disaster, he has emerged as a leading critic of Japan’s nuclear energy program. Although I agree with Hirose that nuclear power is replete with danger, I must note that his premises are largely false and his reasoning fallacious. But my goal here is not to dwell on the content of the anti-Western and anti-Semitic conspiracy theories Hirose propounds. I merely want to note that he can be legitimately described as a pan-Asianist. I realized this after I read Hirose’s Japan’s Destiny, Asia’s Destiny, published in 2004.

In this book, echoing the views of Japan’s prewar pan-Asianists, Hirose bemoans the moral decay and vulgarity of the United States and deplores what he believes is the slavish dependence of the Japanese establishment on America. Noting that America has fallen into moral decrepitude, is “spiritually stagnant,” and weakened politically by its military overstretch throughout the world, Hirose argues that “at long last we, the Japanese, have now a chance to lead Asia independently. No better opportunity than this will ever come our way….We must view Asia as our new paradise” (p. 374).

As Hirose sees it, it is the pernicious American influence that prevented Japan from remaining a genuine Asian country in the first place, because it caused the Japanese to lose empathy with their fellow-Asians. “After the war in Japan,” he says, “the feeling of friendship and solidarity with Asians was largely lost” (p. 382), presumably on account of the shameless deal with the United States by Japan’s leaders who swapped their (and Japan’s) Asian soul in exchange for material prosperity.

The conclusion is obvious. The long-lost empathy with their fellow-Asians can be regained, says Hirose, only if Japan “renounces its alliance with the United States.” Only then, he insists, Japan will be able to become the leader of Asia.

Such expressions of solidarity with Asia may come as a surprise when voiced by an anti-nuclear campaigner (for surely the problem of nuclear energy is not only limited to Asia but is of concern to all mankind), but they have much in common both with the views of many idealistic Japanese volunteers working to help the needy in war-afflicted Asian countries and, on the opposite extreme of the political spectrum, with the views of Ishihara Shintarô, a populist politician whose Pan-Asianist views we document in our Pan-Asianism: a Documentary History. Hirose’s case provides further evidence for the great relevance of Pan-Asianism to understanding modern Japan and Asia.

Christopher W. A. Szpilman is professor of modern Japanese history and international relations at Kyushu Sangyo University, Fukuoka. He is the co-editor of Pan-Asianism: A Documentary History, Volumes 1 and 2.

Ending the Benign Neglect Myth: President Obama's Trip to Brazil

By Britta H. Crandall

President Obama will make a historic visit to Brazil this month where he is slated to meet with his newly elected Brazilian counterpart, President Dilma Rousseff. The White House described Obama’s visit to Brazil as a chance to “advance our efforts to work as equal partners” to address the challenges facing Latin America. Brazil is becoming an equal partner indeed. Its economy is the world’s seventh largest; it is a global leader in the export of iron, soy, orange juice, and aircraft; and the 2007 discovery of an estimated eight to twelve billion barrels of light crude oil off its coast poise it to become a leading oil exporter. Further, the country has clearly made the successful transition from a military regime to a vibrant democracy. The choice of Brazil for Obama’s Latin America trip undoubtedly reflects the ascent of the South American giant. And for some, Obama’s visit potentially represents a long-overdue interest in Brazil on behalf of the U.S. government.

The United States has long been accused of adopting a policy of “benign neglect” toward Brazil. In recent decades, for example, the White House has not cooperated with Brazil at high levels as it did during World War II and has not meddled in Brazilian domestic affairs as it did in the 1960s. Many U.S. policymakers and the public alike seemingly have very little concept of U.S. policy toward Brazil. One previous State Department official even referred to Brazil as the “black hole” of U.S. foreign diplomacy given its size and significance in relation to the low degree of engagement and attention that emanate from the U.S. government. The White House, as opposed to the Palacio do Planalto in Brasilia, is commonly blamed for this lack of high-level cooperation between the two governments.

However, bilateral engagement is a two-way street. It takes two to tango, or in this case, samba. Rather than benign neglect from Washington, it is a lack of common interests that limit U.S. engagement with Brazil. Up until the 21st century, with only a few exceptions, Brazil was not strong, problematic, or threatening enough to bring its own issues to the table aside from a steady quest for increased economic aid, and it did not have the relative power to serve as an effective military or economic partner for the United States. Brazil’s foreign policy tradition emphasizing economic development and national sovereignty further limited the potential areas for engagement with Washington.

However, the erosion of the power gap between the United States and Brazil begun in earnest in the 21st century is beginning to have dramatic effects on the bilateral relationship. The less-asymmetrical relationship means that the two countries’ range of policy concerns is beginning to see increased overlap. Brazil’s role as an energy supplier will mean more engagement with the Obama administration as it embarks on a new energy policy. Brazil has become a global leader in the areas of international environmental protection and international trade. Moreover, as the United States addresses its diminished influence in Latin America, the growing importance of Brazil’s role as a moderate voice in the region will also mean ongoing engagement with Washington.

The simple yet powerful role of Brazilian interest in U.S. ties should not be overlooked. President Rousseff’s greater willingness to engage the United States opens up a world of opportunities for bilateral cooperation. President Obama’s trip, then, represents a new opportunity for the United States not because of a long overdue U.S. interest in Brazil, but because of the new openness and pragmatism of the Brazilian government, fostered by the rise of Brazil’s economic and geopolitical prowess.

Britta H. Crandall is adjunct professor of political science at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies and the author of Hemispheric Giants: The Misunderstood History of U.S.-Brazilian Relations (Rowman & Littlefield 2011).

Hillary Clinton’s Visit to Brazil Faces an Autonomous Foreign Policy

By Tullo Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni

The times are changing. Developing countries like China, India and Brazil are reaching a renewed status. Although China and India normally attracts more attention due to their superior economic growth, Brazil is the closest to the United States in geographical terms. This creates both opportunities and conflicts as the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton realized in her visit to Brazil on March 3th, 2010. Discussing Brazil-Iran relationship was a top priority in Clinton’s visit to Brazil. Secretary Clinton insists that Brazil join the United States pressure on Iran. Lula's government regards sanctions as a step towards military force. Brazil enjoys an excellent relation with the United States. For example, the U.S. is still one of the most important Brazilian trade partners. In 2009, however, U.S.-Brazil relationship fell victim to disagreements over Honduras, military bases in Colombia, WTO cotton dispute and, as we mentioned, tensions over Iran.

Historically Brazil has insisted on keeping its autonomy from great powers. The Brazilian elite, including the highly trained Brazilian diplomats, always dreamed of Brazil as a global autonomous power in a multipolar world. Autonomy is certainly not a deliberate attempt to thwart U.S. diplomacy, but sometimes collides with U.S. interests. As we show in our book, Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times, the notion of autonomy assumes different forms throughout the Brazilian history. With Lula, Brazil pursues a strategy of autonomy through diversification. According to our definition, this strategy consists of an adherence to international norms and principles by means of South-South alliances, and through agreements with non-traditional partners (China, Asia-Pacific, Africa, Eastern Europe, Middle East etc.), trying to reduce asymmetries in external relations with powerful countries.

This explains the Brazilian foreign policy towards Iran. Since Brazil's relation with the United States is good but stable, Brazil has to establish new partnerships to increase its power in the international scenario. (China has a similar position to Iran. Although we do not claim to be experts on China, we suspect that the same explanation applies to this other BRIC country)

Brazil partnership with Iran poses problems on the subject of human rights, which is often discussed by Brazilian government and society (intellectuals, media, etc.). Nonetheless, the idea of non-intervention is also a trace of the Brazilian diplomatic discourse. In this way, President Lula argues that sanctions against Iran are ineffective, and Iran should not be “pushed against a wall” by the international community. Defending Iran position in a subject that Lula sees as central to keeps Brazil autonomy, he states: “What I want for Iran is what I want for Brazil: the use and development of nuclear energy for peaceful ends”. Brazilian foreign policy is clear in this regard: no nuclear weapons, but the right to use nuclear energy peacefully. This is an issue that will grow in international relations, linked with the environment issues.

Tullo Vigevani is professor of political science at São Paulo State University (UNESP), research coordinator of the Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies, coordinator of the National Institute for Studies on the United States, and cooordinator of the post-graduate program on international relations at the State University of Campinas and the Pontifical Catholic University of São Paolo and Gabriel Cepaluni has recently been a visiting researcher in the department of government at Georgetown University. They are the authors of Brazilian Foreign Policy in Changing Times: The Quest for Autonomy from Sarney to Lula.