By Paul J. Rich
In 1914 the British, largely with Indian troops, landed at Basra at the head of the Persian Gulf and began a disastrous march to Baghdad. They were surrounded by the Turks at Kut and there suffered a defeat that was compared to that of Yorktown. The casualties were enormous.
It is amazing that so little attention has been paid to this invasion and to the subsequent unhappy British occupation of what then were the Turkish provinces of Mesopotamia. The region was of course to become Iraq and the British would struggle with trying to impose their agenda well into the 1930s.
So little is said about this that one would think it was a secret, but there is no lack of information on the subject. There are some classic volumes such A.J. Barker’s The Neglected War: Mesopotamia 1914-18, and Briton Cooper Busch’s Britain and the Persian Gulf and his Britain, India, and the Arabs. In fact, scholars have done such notable work on the period and region that it is frustrating to see how untutored American policy towards the peoples of Iraq has been.
Reading about the attempted consolidation of Middle Eastern straps along Western lines in the past might have prevented some of the mistakes that have been made by the United States in its recent interventions. And there remains a great wealth of original source material to explore should anyone be inclined. One valuable archive is the records of the Mesopotamian Commission after the war, a highly controversial fact-finding tribunal investigating the British blunders during the campaign. Charges that it whitewashed the conduct of high British officials have never been resolved.
In retrospect, the British decision to land at Basra and create Iraq had much to do with the desire of those in charge of the Empire to extend Imperial rule into the Middle East. The Gulf shaikhdoms were already part of that Empire and taking the head of the Gulf and then going on to Baghdad seemed a logical extension. Figures such as Sir Percy Cox and Sir Arnold Wilson were the Colin Powells and Donald Rumsfelds of the period.
Occam’s razor is well applied to the Middle East situation. It is not atomic science to ask that American foreign policy display more sophistication. One simply must know something bout the nuances, the cultures, the ancient animosities, before plunging willy-nilly into marching to Baghdad. We didn’t.
Paul J. Rich is president of the Policy Studies Organization in Washington, D.C., visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and the editor of Iraq and Gertrude Bell's The Arab of Mesopotamia, Iraq and Rupert Hay's Two Years in Kurdistan, Iraq and Eleanor Egan's The War in the Cradle of the World, and the author of the forthcoming Creating the Arabian Gulf: The British Raj and the Invasions of the Gulf.
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