By Helen J. Knowles
Watchers of the work of the U.S. Supreme Court eagerly anticipate June, when that institution frequently announces several blockbuster outcomes in the cases that remain to be decided. As the Court brings its term to a close at the end of that month, anticipation mounts as commentators speculate about possible votes and the likely identity of the justices who will pen opinions (for the majority, and separately in concurrences and dissents). June 2009 promises to be no different.
It is perilous to try and predict the direction of the twists and turns that justice will take at the Court during what remains of this year of its work. To be sure, we know that the Term’s end will bring the retirement of Justice Souter, and the inevitable feeding frenzy that will accompany the confirmation hearings of his nominated successor, Judge Sotomayor. Before that happens, however, several major cases remain to be decided. While the results will not be known until the justices choose to make them public, there is one thing about which most commentators agree, regardless of ideology. Articles in the both the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal reach the same conclusion: In Ricci v. DeStefano and Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. Holder, the man at the jurisprudential center of the Court will be the deciding vote; the key to these cases will be Justice Anthony M. Kennedy. What commentators ignore, however, is what might actually be the key to these cases as Justice Kennedy sees them. That key is the concept of “dignity.” During his two decades on the Court, this concept has been just as significant to Kennedy’s jurisprudence as has been the “man in the middle” role he has played on a bench frequently split between four more conservative and four more moderate men and women.
In this, the first of two blog entries, I look at the potential “dignity” reading that a Kennedy-authored opinion might give to the issues involved in Ricci v. DeStefano (a case which has taken on added significance since President Obama’s nomination of Judge Sotomayor – who was part of the lower appeals court panel of judges whose decision was appealed to the Supreme Court (her participation in the case is discussed over at Scotusblog)). Next time, I will offer a similar discussion of Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. Holder.
Ricci v. DeStefano
Two years ago, when the Court struck down two school districts’ plans that used race as a factor in assigning students to schools, Kennedy refused to agree with Chief Justice John Roberts’s now-famous postulate about solving racial tensions in America. Kennedy said it was shortsighted of his colleague to proclaim: “the way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.” This difference of opinion separates these two justices who otherwise share a commitment to a color-blind Constitution, and it is probable that it will play an important role in Ricci. For Kennedy, dignity is likely to be key to the case because it is this concept that resides at the heart of his modestly libertarian reading of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. It is this constitutional provision that Frank Ricci and a group of his firefighting colleagues say that the City of New Haven, Connecticut violated when it denied them the promotions they were due. After creating and administering a race-neutral exam explicitly intended to achieve merit-based selection of individuals to fill leadership positions in the fire department, the City decided it did not like the results. The original emphasis on merit needed reevaluation when no African American firefighter did well enough to be considered for promotion. The race-neutral test (and its results – which placed Ricci (who is white) sixth in a class of seventy-seven individuals) was thrown out. If this is New Haven’s effort at race-conscious hiring in order to achieve diversity amongst its first responders, what happens to those who succeed on merit, but fail because of their race, rather than vice versa?
Over at his legal blog last year, Michael Dorf, Cornell University law professor and former Kennedy clerk, observed that “dignity” is susceptible to labeling as a mere “weasel word” because its ambiguity invites judges to use it when it suits their particular policy needs. Nevertheless, Dorf encourages us to resist this characterization. In terms of the current composition of the Court, this resistance has been voiced most strongly by Kennedy, who makes no secret of his belief that “dignity” is important to constitutional interpretation. Whatever one’s view of using an unenumerated concept (in this respect, “dignity” resembles “privacy”) for understanding the Constitution, the fact remains that Kennedy is the de facto ideological leader of the current Court. When he takes dignity seriously, so do his colleagues.
Two of the briefs filed in Ricci by groups with an interest in the case (interestingly, filed in support of New Haven) seemed to realize this, even though their discussions of “dignity” were fleeting. During oral argument, although Justice Kennedy did not invoke it, the concept of “dignity” played an important role. Mr. Ricci’s attorney made an effort to persuade at least a majority of the Court that New Haven violated “that singular principle of individual dignity” by discriminating on the basis of race.
Justice Kennedy objects to judicial opinions that portray the intractable issue of race as something that can be easily solved by judicial imposition of absolutist readings of the Constitution. In Kennedy’s mind, engaging the country in an honest dialogue about the human “dignity” that attaches to all, regardless of their race, is more profitable than vowing to end discrimination by judicial fiat. In a 2007 Newsweek interview, Kennedy responded to Roberts’s call for greater unanimity on the Court by saying: “My initial reaction was going to be, ‘Just let me write all the opinions.’’” If he does not receive the majority opinion assignment in Ricci, Kennedy is unlikely to be pleased if the chosen author is not sensitive to his dignity-based understanding of individualized equality. Should Justice Kennedy decide to write separately, his past writings strongly suggest he will speak in the language of dignity.
Helen J. Knowles is assistant professor of political science at SUNY, Oswego. She is the author of The Tie Goes to Freedom: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy on Liberty.