How much more peacemaking can the Middle East endure?

By Stephen Marmura

The ongoing violence between Palestinian militants operating from inside Gaza and Israeli forces raises real concerns about the future and well being of the region and its peoples. It also invites worrisome questions about the true character and ultimate objectives of American state policies towards Israel/Palestine. When Arial Sharon decided to remove Israeli settlements from Gaza in 2005, he did so for strategic reasons, and without any prodding from the Bush administration. Likewise, Israel’s accompanying strategy of consolidating its hold and on the West Bank has met with no resistance from the US. Quite the contrary, Bush effectively endorsed Sharon’s (and now Olmert’s) strategy of expanding existing settlements by stating that it was unrealistic for the Palestinians to ever expect sovereignty over West Bank territory where Israel has its largest settlement blocs. Not coincidentally, these blocs are located above the West Bank’s main water aquifers. As was the case under previous administrations, US aid to Israel, which amounts to roughly one third of all American aid world-wide, continues to flow in the face of Israel’s illegal settlement building practices.

The unforgiving stance which the US has long adopted towards the Palestinian people is matched only by its unwavering support for the Israeli state. Three years ago, Bush declared that “It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.” Yet, when Palestinians exercised their democratic rights and elected Hamas into power in Gaza in 2006, the Bush administration responded by cutting off aid while simultaneously encouraging Fatah to launch a coup. While placing sanctions on a people already living under an illegal military occupation may represent a historic novelty, it is also an act which is entirely in keeping with American policies dating back to Israel’s capture of the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the Six-Day War of 1967. When the Carter administration induced Egypt to sign a separate peace with Israel in 1979, it effectively neutralized the only Arab force potentially capable of countering Israeli militarism and expansionism. No sooner were the Camp David Accords signed, than Israel began to intensify its settlement building in the West Bank. Three years later, when Israel invaded Lebanon in an attempt to crush the PLO as a political force, it was able to do so without fear of any serious resistance from the larger Arab world, and was quickly rewarded for its efforts with a generous increase in US financial and military aid. All rhetoric about peacemaking aside, the fact is that the US has effectively been subsidizing Israeli settlement building in the remainder of historic Palestine while shielding successive Israeli governments from international pressure for the past forty-one years.

While it may not be common knowledge among North Americans, since at least the mid-1970s the PLO, along with every Arab state bordering Israel, has indicated its willingness to make peace with Israel based on relevant Security Council resolutions and recognition of Palestinian national rights. That willingness was formalized at the Fez Summit of 1982, and reaffirmed by the Arab League during the Saudi peace initiative of 2002. The Bush administration has responded predictably to the latter, issuing statements about the need for substantive peace talks, while placing no serious pressure on Israel to respond to the initiative favorably. The recent US sponsored “peace summit” in Annapolis merely underscores this point. Rather than being used as an opportunity to push for resolution of the most crucial issues standing in the way of a two-state solution, such as the Palestinian refugee issue, Israeli settlements and the status of East Jerusalem, the summit was instead seized upon by the Bush administration as a platform to encourage the formation of a common front amongst Israel and “moderate” Arab states against Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas. Needless to say the latter were not invited to the peace talks. Likewise, Hamas’ recent offers to recognize the state of Israel – as opposed to Israel’s alleged “right” to lay claim to most of historic Palestine – and negotiate a peace agreement with it have been dismissed by both the Bush administration and the Israeli political elements it favors.

That the unqualified support which successive US administrations have given to Israel’s expansionist policies is directly at odds with America’s proclaimed desire to facilitate a lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians is clear. Obvious as well, is the fact that a truly even-handed approach to peacemaking – one whereby the US would stop vetoing every UN resolution critical of Israel’s occupation practices and instead use its influence to compel Israel to withdraw from illegally occupied land – would greatly enhance America’s effectiveness in its present War on Terror. Al Qaeda would certainly not be placated or deterred from attacking US interests, but it would lose a key basis of its popular support, making it far easier for America’s allies in the Arab and Muslim worlds to isolate and diminish it as a serious political and military force. These rather elementary observations beg two very serious questions. First, what exactly are the primary motivations and political forces driving US policies towards Israel/Palestine? Secondly, what if anything could conceivably induce a policy shift?

Recently, Mearsheimer & Walt (2008) have come under fire for suggesting that American Mideast policies are best explained by the apparent stranglehold which Jewish Zionist and Christian fundamentalist pro-Israel lobbies have on Congress. By contrast, critics on the left such as Noam Chomsky and Stephen Zunes have downplayed the relative importance of such pressure groups, pointing instead to longstanding US interests in the region’s oil supply and to Israel’s related role as America’s regional enforcer. These two lines of argument are not mutually exclusive. Equally important is the fact that lobbies such as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and the Christian Coalition differ in character from commercial lobbies such as those representing the oil industry, tobacco, or major arms manufacturers. More specifically, their dual nature as entrenched presences on capital hill on the one hand, and genuine expressions of grassroots ideological currents in American society on the other, make them particularly formidable allies of those elite interests driving US foreign policy more generally. The challenges that this reality presents to activists hoping to bring about a more progressive role for the US in Middle East affairs are considerable. In fact, given the almost complete absence of media and (hence) public scrutiny of the issues raised above, it appears very likely that present policies will change only after their detrimental effects on American interests become so severe that they can no longer be countenanced. This should come as little comfort to the Middle Easterners who continue to bear the brunt of US “peacemaking”.

Stephen M. E. Marmura teaches sociology at Queen's University and is the author of Hegemony in the Digital Age: The Arab/Israeli Conflict Online.