By Gary A. Donaldson
As elections approach, pundits want to compare this presidential campaign to that campaign, these candidates to those candidates, this situation to that. The 2008 campaign is, of course, no different.
It seems reasonable to peg this campaign to 1952. Perhaps the most important comparison, the one that is made most often, is that 2008 is the first campaign since 1952 in which no seated president or vice president made a run for the office. Neither candidate—Adlai E. Stevenson (then the Democratic governor of Illinois) nor Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower—had ever been in the Oval Office. Yes (for those trivia experts out there) old Alben Barkley, Harry Truman’s VP, was officially a candidate for about 20 days in July. But when the AFL-CIO said they would not support his candidacy (they said he was too old, at 74) he took his hat out of the ring.
Both elections (1952 and this one, 2008) followed extremely unpopular administrations. Truman had sunk to probably the lowest point of any president in American history. In March 1952 his approval ratings crashed to a dismal 23 percent. Most historians usually find this fascinating because today Truman is revered as a sort of presidential hero: the little guy who stood up to the Russian Bear, “The buck stops here” president who took the heat, “Give’em hell, Harry,” all of that. But while he was in office he was not popular. Most Americans saw him as an interim president—between FDR and what would come later (probably the Republicans). There was corruption in his administration. And, oh yes, there was that unpopular war in Korea.
It should not be surprising that George W. Bush, on his way out of Washington, has taken Truman’s legacy to heart. Bush’s approval ratings are not quite as low as Truman’s. A fair assessment for our current president runs at about 28 percent. More than once, Bush (and several around him) have cited Truman’s dazzling legacy as a reason for the president’s lack of concern for his own poor approval ratings. Ah, presidential legacy. What will historians say about me?
Both presidents found themselves enveloped in an unpopular Asian war. In the summer of 1950, communist North Korea invaded non-communist South Korea. With no input from any advisors on any level, Truman decided to intervene. In fact, he later said that he made the decision, alone, in the plane flight back to Washington from his home in Missouri just hours after being notified of the attack. It seemed to be the right thing to do, at least at first. It was officially a United Nations operation, albeit under U.S. command. And Truman tried to minimize the impact of the event by avoiding the nasty word “war” and calling it a “police action.” But by October the Chinese had entered, and there was no denying that it was a genuine war—with genuine casualties reported daily in the press. Despite the rhetoric that the United States needed to contain the spread of vile communism, by the time of the 1952 campaign the war had become a stalemate in a far off land and the nation had grown tired. To make matters worse for Democrats (who were shackled by the war) Eisenhower, in the last weeks before Election Day, announced “I will go to Korea.” To most Americans, the implication was clear: The great general would deal with this awful problem.
How does a newly-elected president stop an unpopular war? The nation might be asking that question after November 4, 2008. Ike went to Korea in late November 1952, just after the election, as promised. But as president-elect he could do nothing except boost the national morale. To most Americans, however, it seemed to be a signal that he would end the war. And he did that—probably as soon as he reasonably could, in about six months after his inauguration. There were those at the time (particularly those on the right in Ike’s own party) who insisted that the U.S. should have initiated a total war (a euphemism for nuclear weapons) and driven the communists off the Korean Peninsula and even out of China. And there are still those today who argue that the world’s problems with North Korea have developed from that premature armistice signed in July 1953 that ended the Korean War, but that allowed the Stalinist regime to continue above the 38th Parallel. Perhaps there are lessons here for the next president: One candidate wants to end an ill-conceived and unpopular war. The other would say that a premature end to the war would bring on additional problems for the future, and that the nation should carry the war to its final conclusions—despite the cost.
It was Eisenhower—the Republican, man with the military background, the man who orchestrated the liberation of Europe—who ended the nasty war in Korea, the war that the Democrats had started and could not end.
Gary A. Donaldson is professor of history at Xavier University of Louisiana and author, most recently, of The First Modern Campaign: Kennedy, Nixon, and the Election of 1960.
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